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on Transboundary Aquifers: 
A Missed Opportunity for Cross-Fertilisation?
Owen McIntyre
University College Cork, Cork, Co. Cork, Ireland
Abstract
While the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers adopted in 2008 by the International 
Law Commission (ILC)1 follow the same format as the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention2 and might 
reasonably have been expected to adopt a similar normative approach wherever possible, the Preamble to 
the Draft Articles fails to make any reference to this or to other seminal instruments or codifications in 
the area of international water resources law and the document takes, in some respects, a radically differ-
ent and less progressive stance. The principal difference in the Draft Articles, and one which can be linked 
to most of the other deviations, is the inclusion of an express reference to the sovereignty of aquifer States 
in a manner implying that this is the key guiding principle of the instrument. This emphasis on State 
sovereignty over shared, and often migratory, water resources appears to represent something of a retreat 
from the distributive equity inherent in the firmly established principle of equitable and reasonable utili-
zation and from the intense procedural and institutional cooperation required to achieve the community 
of interests approach necessary to give meaning to this principle. Reliance on sovereignty implies instead 
a drift towards a position based more on the narrow and immediate self-interest of States. In order to 
avoid such an interpretation, it would have been better if the Draft Articles had sought to establish two 
separate but parallel regimes, one based on sovereignty and covering the static geological formation of the 
aquifer, and one covering the shared water resources contained in, and transiting through, the formation 
and based on equitable and reasonable utilization. 
Keywords
groundwater; surface waters; sovereignty; fragmentation 
1. Introduction
The key principles of international water resources law are now firmly established 
and increasingly well understood in terms of their practical application, at least 
with regard to transboundary surface waters. Although already part of customary 
1) UN Doc. A/RES/63/124 (2009). See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
Its Sixtieth Session, UN GAOR, 62nd Sess., Suppl. No. 10, UN Doc. A/63/10 (2008). 
2) 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(New York, 21 May 1997), not yet in force, (1997) 36 ILM 22.
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international law, the key principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation3 
and the related duty of States to prevent significant transboundary harm,4 along 
with various associated procedural requirements,5 have been endorsed under the 
1997 UN Watercourses Convention and supported in recent statements of the 
International Court of Justice.6 In addition, the ongoing evolution of several 
emerging principles of international environmental law, including the precau-
tionary principle7 and the ecosystems approach,8 lends some normative depth 
and environmental coherence to this body of rules. 
The ILC has taken a further significant step in the elaboration of a comprehen-
sive body of international rules on water resources by its adoption of the 2008 
Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers. This elaboration of specific 
rules belatedly recognizes the vital importance of groundwater resources, their 
unique vulnerability, and their quite distinct geophysical characteristics. How-
ever, the current Draft Articles are likely to give rise to some uncertainty and 
confusion as regards their scope of application and that of the UN Watercourses 
Convention. This matters because the Draft Articles take a markedly different 
approach to the utilization and environmental protection of transboundary water 
3) See Articles 5 and 6 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, setting out the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilization and the factors relevant to its application, represent a codification of the posi-
tion under general international water resources law. For example, the ILC Commentary to Article 5 
of the 1994 ILC Draft Articles, which were the precursor for the text of the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention adopted by the UN General Assembly, reports that
A survey of all available evidence of the general practice of States, accepted as law, in respect of the 
non-navigational uses of international watercourses . . . reveals that there is overwhelming support 
for the doctrine of equitable utilization as a general rule for the determination of the rights and 
obligations of States in this field.
International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Sixth Session, UN GAOR 49th Sess., Suppl. No. 10, UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994), p. 222. See further, 
Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd ed., 2007) pp. 384–405; Owen McIntyre, 
Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under International Law (2007) pp. 53–86. 
4) See Article 7 of the UN Watercourses Convention. See further, McCaffrey, ibid., pp. 406–445; 
McIntyre, ibid., pp. 87–119. 
5) See Articles 8–9 and 11–19 of the UN Watercourses Convention. See further, McCaffrey, ibid., 
pp. 464–480.
6) See in particular Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), International 
Court of Justice, 20 April 2010; Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 
(1997), ICJ Reports 7. See further, Owen McIntyre, ‘Environmental protection of international rivers: 
Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 10 Journal of Environmental Law 
(1998) pp. 79–91; Owen McIntyre, ‘The Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity of International Water 
Law: Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), International Court of 
Justice, 20 April 2010’, 22 Journal of Environmental Law (2010) pp. 475–497.
7) See further, McIntyre, supra, n. 3, pp. 265–283.
8) See further, McCaffrey, supra, n. 3, pp. 446–462; McIntyre, ibid., pp. 286–313; Owen McIntyre, 
‘The “Ecosystems Approach” to the Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources’ 13 Review 
of European Community and International Environmental Law (2004) p. 1; Attila Tanzi and Maurizio 
Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(2002) p. 117.
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resources from the UN Convention in a number of key respects. For example, 
due in part to the manner in which ‘transboundary aquifers’ are defined in the 
Draft Articles, they place emphasis on the principle of State sovereignty, which 
would appear to be at odds with current understanding of the principle of reason-
able and equitable utilization. Further, some aspects of the Draft Articles might 
be regarded as rowing back on progress achieved under the UN Convention, for 
example, in the emphasis placed upon natural characteristics as a factor in the 
determination of an equitable and reasonable share of groundwater resources. Of 
course, other aspects of the Draft Articles can be regarded as entirely progressive, 
such as the clear emphasis placed on the distribution of ‘benefits’ to be derived 
from transboundary aquifers. 
This article seeks to explore the opportunities, missed and remaining, for the 
‘cross-fertilisation’ of ideas between the UN Watercourses Convention and the 
ILC Draft Articles in respect of the normative content, relative significance and 
practical application of key principles of international water resources law. Given 
the dearth of State and treaty practice in relation to transboundary aquifers, it is 
useful to try to identify which aspects of general international water law might 
inform inter-State practice on groundwater resources. Conversely, the more pro-
gressive aspects of the Draft Articles can help to advance understanding of water 
resources law generally. At any rate, a coherent and integrated framework for 
State cooperation on the utilization and protection of all shared water resources 
must be preferable to one that is fragmented and confused. 
2. Cross-fertilisation vs. Fragmentation9
Whereas international law relating generally to the use and environmental pro-
tection of shared freshwater resources is reasonably well developed, the accepted 
rules and principles have largely evolved from practice in respect of surface waters, 
despite the vital significance of groundwater resources for meeting human needs. 
There are currently over 400 international agreements relating to transboundary 
surface waters,10 including binding regional framework agreements, such as the 
1992 UNECE Helsinki Convention,11 which has inspired several subsequent 
 9) On the phenomenon of fragmentation, see Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group 
of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, pp. 10–30. See also, Jaye 
Ellis, ‘Sustainable Development and Fragmentation in International Society’, in D. French (ed.), Global 
Justice and Sustainable Development (2010) pp. 57–73.
10) Kerstin Mechlem, ‘Moving Ahead in Protecting Freshwater Resources: The International Law Com-
mission’s Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers’, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law (2009) 
p. 803, citing the International Freshwater Treaties Database managed by Oregon State University, avail-
able at http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/interfreshtreatdata.html.
11) UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes (Helsinki, 17 March 1992) 31 ILM 1312.
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river basin agreements.12 Groundwater resources tended either to be completely 
ignored or only nominally included under such arrangements.13 Significantly, the 
law relating to the utilization of shared international ‘watercourses’ has been 
meticulously codified by the work of the ILC leading to the adoption of the 1997 
UN Watercourses Convention which, though not in force, is immensely influen-
tial upon the practice of States14 and has provided the basis for subsequent bind-
ing regional frameworks, such as the 2000 Revised SADC Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses.15 International water resources law has received considerable atten-
tion from learned societies, notably including the International Law Association 
(ILA), which adopted an absolutely seminal early codification of the area in the 
form of its 1966 Helsinki Rules,16 which have since been overtaken by the more 
progressive but contentious 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources.17 As a high-
profile environmental and developmental issue, international water resources 
received considerable scrutiny in the lead up to the 1992 Rio process and bene-
fited from the guidance provided under Chapter 18 of Agenda 21,18 as well as 
from the key rules and principles set out under the Rio Declaration.19 In addi-
tion, international courts and arbitral tribunals have examined the practical appli-
cation of a variety of aspects of international water law, with the International 
Court of Justice delivering two landmark judgments in recent years concerning 
disputes over international rivers.20 It is telling that in each of these cases, the 
dispute turned on the practical implications of existing bilateral river basin agree-
ments. Not surprisingly perhaps, this area has recently been the subject of intense 
and illuminating academic scrutiny and debate.
In stark contrast, prior to the adoption of the 2008 ILC Draft Articles the 
specific topic of shared international groundwater resources has been quite 
neglected. International treaty practice consists of a mere handful of international 
12) See, for example, Agreement on the Protection of the Scheldt (Charleville-Mézières, 26 April 1994); 
Agreement on the Protection of the Meuse (Charleville-Mézières, 26 April 1994); Convention on Coop-
eration for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube (Sofia, 29 June 1994); Convention 
on the Protection of the Rhine (Rotterdam, 22 January 1998).
13) See Mechlem, supra, n. 9, p. 804.
14) See McIntyre, supra, n. 3, p. 2; Attila Tanzi, ‘The UN Convention on International Watercourses as a 
Framework for the Avoidance and Settlement of Water Law Disputes’ 11 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (1998) 441. 
15) 40 ILM (2001) 321.
16) International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Second Conference of the International Law Associa-
tion (Helsinki, 1966).
17) 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources adopted at the ILA seventy-first conference, Berlin, August 
2004, by Resolution No. 2/2004. See International Law Association, Fourth Report of the Committee on 
Water Resources Law (2004).
18) Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 
1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. II) (1992).
19) Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/Rev.1 (1992), 31 
ILM 876. 
20) Supra, n. 6.
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agreements applying specifically to groundwaters, only two of which create bind-
ing substantive arrangements,21 while two others relate, respectively, to monitor-
ing and data sharing for the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System and a consultation 
mechanism for the Northwest Sahara Aquifer System.22 Of course, in August 2010 
the four States sharing the Guarani Aquifer System concluded a detailed binding 
agreement, which took inspiration from and largely follows the guidance pro-
vided by the ILC’s 2008 Draft Articles.23 In 1986, the ILA adopted its Seoul 
Rules on International Groundwaters,24 which sought to outline the application 
of the 1966 Helsinki Rules to shared groundwater resources, but were not widely 
endorsed by the practice of States. Additional non-binding guidance on national 
measures was provided by the 1989 UNECE Charter on Groundwater Manage-
ment.25 Although the need for integration of surface and groundwater resources 
for the purposes of water quantity and quality management was stressed under 
Agenda 21, and a separate Chapter VIII on Groundwater was included in the 
ILA’s 2004 Berlin Rules, the area had remained underdeveloped.
Therefore, one might reasonably have expected that the ILC’s efforts to elabo-
rate a legal framework for transboundary aquifers would have been guided to a 
very significant degree by the more developed corpus of rules on international 
watercourses, particularly as the UN Watercourses Convention purports to apply 
to groundwaters physically linked to surface waters. The ILC’s 1994 Resolution 
on Confined Groundwaters,26 adopted on completion of its 1994 Draft Articles 
on the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Watercourses, which went on to 
form the basis of the UN Convention, made a clear distinction between ground-
water ‘related to an international watercourse’, which was to be covered by the 
1994 Draft Articles (and thus by the UN Convention), and ‘confined trans-
boundary groundwater’, in relation to which the Resolution would apply, com-
mending States to be guided where appropriate by the principles contained in the 
Draft Articles. Similarly, Article 42 of the ILA’s 2004 Berlin Rules, for example, 
provides that the rules applicable to internationally shared waters apply to an 
aquifer that is connected to shared international surface waters or that is uncon-
nected to international surface waters but is intersected by the boundaries of two 
or more States. Of course, the ILC’s 1994 Resolution on Confined Groundwaters 
can be understood as having implicitly recognized the particular hydro-geological 
21) 2007 Franco-Swiss Geneva Aquifer Convention, replacing a 1997 arrangement concerning ground-
water quality, abstraction and recharge. See Mechlem, supra, n. 9, at 803. 
22) See Mechlem, ibid., at 803–4. Both instruments are reprinted in Stefano Burchi and Kerstin Mechlem 
(eds.), Groundwater in International Law: Compilation of Treaties and other Legal Instruments (2004) 
pp. 4–8. 
23) Guarani Aquifer Agreement (San Juan, 2 August 2010).
24) International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Second Conference of the International Law Associa-
tion (Seoul, 1987). 
25) UN Doc. E/ECE/1197 ECE/ENVWA/12.
26) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two), p. 135.
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characteristics and unique regulatory challenges of shared groundwater resources, 
while also advocating coherence in international water law. First of all, in terms 
of ‘regulating transboundary groundwater’, which would appear sufficiently 
broad to include both ‘related’ and ‘confined’ groundwater, the Resolution merely 
commended States to be guided by the general principles contained in the 1994 
Draft Article ‘where appropriate’, thus recognizing the need for some specific 
rules on groundwater.27 Indeed, the Resolution simultaneously highlighted ‘the 
need for continuing efforts to elaborate rules pertaining to confined transbound-
ary groundwater’ while also stating the ILC’s view that ‘the principles contained 
in its draft articles . . . may be applied to transboundary confined groundwater’.28 
Anyway, it is not clear that groundwater resources can be so neatly divided 
between ‘confined’ groundwater and groundwater ‘related to an international 
watercourse’. Also, it appears that neither the UN Convention nor the 1994 
Resolution would apply to aquifers that are recharged solely from precipitation or 
that discharge either into the sea or into another aquifer.29 It must also be borne 
in mind that, during the elaboration of the ILC’s 1994 Draft Articles and of the 
final text of the UN Convention, the drafters did not focus on the unique regula-
tory challenges posed by groundwater.30 
Alternatively, to the extent that it is inevitable that the 2008 Draft Articles 
would diverge substantively from the approach taken under the UN Watercourses 
Convention, one might have expected that this imperative ought to have been 
explained and that the scope of application of the Draft Articles would have been 
very clearly set out, in order that conflicts with the UN Convention might have 
been avoided. However, this does not appear to be the case. While the UN 
Convention defines a “watercourse” to include ‘surface waters and ground waters 
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally 
flowing into a common terminus’,31 the corresponding provision of the Draft 
Articles defines an “aquifer” as ‘a permeable water-bearing geological formation 
underlain by a less permeable layer and the water contained in the saturated zone 
of the formation’,32 thereby declining to restrict its scope of application merely to 
‘confined’ or non-recharging aquifers or to ground waters unconnected to surface 
waters. Indeed, the inclusion of “recharging aquifers”,33 “recharge zones”34 and 
27) Para. 1.
28) Preambular paras. 4 and 5.
29) See Mechlem, supra, n. 9, p. 805–6, citing as examples 
the Rus Aquifer shared by Saudi Arabia and Qatar which terminates in marine springs in the Persian 
Gulf or the Mountain Aquifer underlying Israel and the West bank, which is recharged solely by 
precipitation in the highlands of the Judean Mountains.
30) Mechlem, ibid., p. 806.
31) Article 2(a) (emphasis added).
32) Draft Article 2(a).
33) Draft Articles 2(f ) and 12.
34) Draft Articles 2(g ) and 11. 
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“discharge zones”35 within the regime proposed under the Draft Articles strongly 
suggests that aquifers connected to surface waters are covered. Thus, though sci-
entific and legal uncertainty as to the nature, extent or adequacy of any connec-
tion between groundwaters and surface waters would anyway be likely to persist, 
the issue arises of which set of rules ought to apply to ground waters physically 
connected to a system of surface waters. The Commentary to the 2008 Draft 
Articles acknowledges that the danger of overlap, and the need for clear priority 
in the case of conflict, between these sets of rules would become all the more 
urgent in the event of the Draft Articles eventually becoming a convention and, 
though the Commission declined to include the proposed Article 20 on the rela-
tionship between the Draft Articles and other conventions and international 
agreements36 until the outcome of its ‘two-stage approach’ was apparent, this 
decision merely defers discussion of a difficult but central issue and confuses the 
precise scope, and thus the appropriate substantive content, of the Draft Articles.37 
To provide an example of the type of potential confusion caused by the mismatch 
between these two instruments, it is worth noting that the 2008 Draft Articles do 
not apply to an aquifer that is situated entirely in one State but contributes to the 
flow of an international watercourse, as they only apply to a ‘transboundary aqui-
fer’ or ‘transboundary aquifer system’.38 The waters of such an aquifer would nor-
mally be covered by the concept of an ‘international watercourse’ to which the 
UN Convention would apply,39 though this deliberate exclusion from the scope 
of the Draft Articles ‘exempts an important constellation from their lex specialis 
rules, so that only more general rules of international law apply’.40 
It is regrettable that the 2008 Draft Articles exacerbate the obvious potential 
for confusing overlap with the UN Watercourses Convention. For example, the 
35) See Draft Articles 2(h), 6, 10 and 11.
36) The proposed Draft Article 20 would have given clear priority to the provisions of the 2008 Draft 
Articles over the provisions of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention in the case of any incompatibility. 
37) See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, supra, n. 1, 
pp. 15–17. 
38) Draft Articles 1 and 2. Ironically, in the light of the emphasis placed on the sovereignty of aquifer 
States under Draft Article 3, such internal water resources are elsewhere classified as ‘sovereign resources’, 
i.e. those ‘located wholly within the territory of a single state’, as opposed to ‘shared resources’, i.e. ‘those 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of two or more states’. See Coalter G. Lathrop, ‘Finding the Right Fit: 
One Design Element in the International Groundwater Resource Regime’, 19 Duke Journal of Compara-
tive and International Law (2009) pp. 422–3. 
39) Article 2.
40) Mechlem, supra, n. 9, p. 809. This strict focus only on transboundary aquifers might also be under-
stood as a rejection of the more integrative, though somewhat controversial, approach taken by the ILA 
in the elaboration of the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources Law, which represented 
a major development of the rules relating to water resources, integrating the traditional rules regard-
ing transboundary waters with rules derived from the customary international environmental law 
and international human rights law that apply to all waters, national as well as international.
Supra, n. 16, p. 2. 
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Draft Articles follow a format which is very similar to that of the Convention, 
with the titles employed for the four parts into which they are divided mirroring 
those used for the corresponding parts of the Convention.41 Clearly, this may 
cause some uncertainty where the normative requirements applying under each 
instrument differ substantively or procedurally. Indeed, it is quite extraordinary 
that the preambular paragraphs of the Draft Articles do not include a single refer-
ence to the UN Watercourses Convention or to any other significant framework 
water resources agreement or codification of the rules of international water 
resources law. 
3. Progressive vs. Regressive Aspects of the ILC Draft Articles
In addition to setting out a highly specific regime for transboundary aquifers 
based on a sound scientific and hydrological understanding of their unique char-
acteristics, the 2008 Draft Articles include a number of quite progressive ele-
ments, which reflect the ongoing evolution of international water resources law 
since the adoption of the UN Watercourses Convention. For example, in relation 
to the scope of application of the regime set out therein, Draft Article 1 sensibly 
includes, in addition to the ‘[u]tilization of transboundary aquifers’, ‘[o]ther 
activities . . . likely to have an impact upon such aquifers’. This is significantly 
broader in scope than the corresponding provision of the UN Convention, which 
only applies to ‘uses of international watercourses and of their waters for purposes 
other than navigation’ and to related measures of protection, preservation and 
management.42 The ILC Commentary to the 2008 Draft Articles cites the careless 
use of chemical fertilizer or pesticide in the vicinity of the aquifer or the construc-
tion of a subway which might impair a geological formation of an aquifer as 
examples of such activities.43 The broader scope of the regime set out under the 
Draft Articles would also extend to cover such activities as the use of aquifers for 
carbon sequestration or for the recovery of heat or energy. Similarly, recognizing 
that impacts may be caused or endured beyond the territory of aquifer States, 
Draft Articles 6, 11, 15, 16 and 17 can apply to States other than aquifer States, 
though they provide few rights to States in which discharge zones are located and 
seek to impose only obligations on States in which recharge zones are located, 
making it highly unlikely that either would wish to cooperate.44 
In relation to the articulation of the principle of equitable and reasonable uti-
lization, Draft Article 4 emphasizes long-term benefits rather than utilization, 
41) See Stephen McCaffrey, ‘The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on Transboundary 
Aquifers’, 103 American Journal of International Law (2009) p. 274.
42) Article 1.
43) Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, supra, n. 1, p. 33.
44) Mechlem, supra, n. 9, pp. 809–10.
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thus potentially permitting broader consideration of relevant factors leading to 
more efficient use of resources and optimization of human benefits.45 In the same 
vein, Draft Article 5 employs a logical reordering of the factors relevant to equi-
table and reasonable utilization, giving sequential priority to the ‘population 
dependent on the aquifer’46 and then to the ‘social, economic and other needs’47 
of the aquifer States. This corresponds with the relative priority normally accorded 
to such factors in the established practice of international water resources 
law.48 Indeed, ‘vital human needs’ not only enjoy a special status under Draft 
Article 5(2),49 but also in respect of emergency situations under Draft Article 
17(3) and, implicitly, in respect of technical cooperation with developing States 
under Draft Article 16 and in respect of armed conflict under Draft Article 18. 
These latter three situations correspond with the directions set out by the Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its 2002 General Comment 
No. 15 on the Right to Water50 at, respectively, paras. 34 and 38, and paras. 21 
and 22, suggesting that the Draft Article were informed by the ongoing interna-
tional discourse on the human right to water. Draft Article 5(g) further highlights 
the inherent vulnerability of aquifers by emphasizing consideration of alternative 
sources of water supply, while Draft Article 5(i) highlights the ‘role of the 
aquifer . . . in the related ecosystem’, thus expressly advocating an ecosystems 
approach to the protection of transboundary aquifers.51 Generally, the Draft 
Articles might be seen to bring some clarity to determination of equitable 
and reasonable utilization by declining to risk confusing to some extent ‘factors 
relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization’ with ‘different kinds of uses’ 
as, arguably, occurs in the case of Articles 6 and 10 of the UN Watercourses 
Convention.
45) On the concept of “benefit-sharing” in respect of transboundary water resources, see Patricia Wouters 
and A. Dan Tarlock, ‘Are Shared Benefits of International Waters an Equitable Apportionment?’, 18 
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy (2007), pp. 523–536; Innes Dombrowsky, 
‘Revisiting the Potential for Benefit-Sharing in the Management of Transboundary Rivers’, 11 Water 
Policy (2009) pp. 125–140.
46) Draft Article 5(1)(a).
47) Draft Article 5(1)(b).
48) For a comprehensive account of State practice in respect of factors relevant to the equitable and 
reasonable utilization of international watercourses, see in particular, Ximena Fuentes, ‘The Criteria 
for the Equitable Utilization of International Rivers’, 67 British Yearbook of International Law (1996) 
pp. 337–412. See also, McIntyre, supra, n. 3, pp. 155–189.
49) After denying the inherent priority of any of the factors listed under Draft Article 5(1), Draft 
Article 5(2) goes on to state
However, in weighing different kinds of utilization of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system, 
special regard shall be given to vital human needs.
50) Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, The Right to Water 
(Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. DOC. 
E/C.12/2002/11, 26 November 2002. 
51) See further, supra, n. 8.
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However, certain aspects of the Draft Articles might be regarded as less pro-
gressive than the UN Convention. For example, in respect of the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization, Article 5(1)(d) appears to place quite consid-
erable emphasis on ‘contribution to the formation and recharge of the aquifer’, 
which the Commentary explains ‘means the comparative size of the aquifer in 
each aquifer State and the comparative importance of the recharge process in each 
State where the recharge zone is located’.52 Despite the fact that corresponding 
factors are listed first in Article 6(1) of the UN Convention, this approach is 
totally at odds with the very minor significance normally attributed under general 
international water resources law to such geophysical factors as the extent of a 
shared watercourse or drainage basin within the territory a riparian State or its 
contribution to the river’s flow,53 and suggests that the version of the principle 
adopted under the Draft Articles may be less distributive in that it is less con-
cerned with human needs and dependence.54 Indeed, this emphasis on hydro-
logical factors is more in keeping with the concepts of State sovereignty over and 
of property in water.55 Similarly, though Draft Article 15 on planned activities 
suggests strongly that States might conduct an EIA and links any EIA to the pro-
cedures of notification, consultation, negotiation and fact-finding, thereby antic-
ipating to some degree the understanding of international water law articulated 
by the ICJ in the recent Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case,56 the Draft Articles 
provide considerably less detail and place less emphasis on procedural obligations 
than Articles 11–19 of the UN Convention. This omission is hardly in keeping 
with the ICJ’s recent findings on the central importance of procedural obligations 
for the general duty of cooperation, the requirements of good faith, and satisfac-
tion of the due diligence requirements of the key substantive obligations set out 
in the Draft Articles.57 However, Draft Article 7(2) does state clearly that ‘aquifer 
States should establish joint mechanisms of cooperation’ for the purposes of the 
general duty to cooperate, another element stressed by the ICJ.58 Further, despite 
the travails of the Commission in its earlier work on watercourses in this regard,59 
52) Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, supra, n. 1, p. 45.
53) Tanzi and Arcari, supra, n. 8, p. 124; Fuentes, supra, n. 47, pp. 398–407; McIntyre, supra, n. 3, 
pp. 179–183.
54) On the human needs focused or ‘distributive’ nature of equity as applied in international water 
resources law, see McIntyre, ibid., p. 149. 
55) On the issue of sovereignty over, and the related of property in, shared water resources, see infra.
56) Supra, n. 6.
57) See McIntyre (2010), supra, n. 6, pp. 488–491.
58) Ibid., p. 491.
59) The Commentary to the ILC’s 1994 Draft Articles went to considerable lengths to clarify the relation-
ship between the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and obligation to prevent transbound-
ary harm stating, for example, that 
the State whose use causes the harm shall . . . consult with the State suffering such harm over . . . 
the extent to which such use is equitable and reasonable taking into account the factors listed 
in Article 6. 
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by declining to include a reference to compensation in Draft Article 6, it is not 
now implicit that the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization enjoys pri-
ority over the duty to prevent significant harm in the case of transboundary aqui-
fers. This may again convey the impression that the Draft Articles are less 
concerned with distributive equity than with sovereignty, which would only be 
restricted to extent strictly necessary under the sic utere tuo principle.60 Finally, 
though Draft Article 5 includes as relevant factors the ‘development, protection 
and conservation’ of the aquifer and its ‘role . . . in the related ecosystem’ and 
Draft Article 10 requires protection and preservation of ecosystems, Draft 
Article 12 on prevention, reduction and control of pollution might be regarded 
as somewhat anaemic in comparison to Article 21 of the UN Watercourses Con-
vention, which provides a definition of “pollution of an international watercourse” 
and suggests a number of types of measures on which States might cooperate.61 
Though Draft Article 12 requires aquifer States to ‘take a ‘precautionary approach’, 
Article 21 is more explicitly eco-centric, including reference to pollution causing 
‘significant harm to other watercourse States or their environment’ and to ‘the 
living resources of the watercourse’. Perhaps this reflects the 2008 Draft Articles’ 
greater focus on the economic rather than the environmental dimension of shared 
water resources, once again stemming from a notion of property in water resources 
supported by that instrument’s reliance on the principle of State sovereignty. 
4. The Problem of Sovereignty 
The definition of “aquifer” contained in the 2008 Draft Articles gives rise to a 
number of problems, not least the fact that the assertion of State sovereignty 
over transboundary aquifers contained in Draft Article 3 extends to shared 
See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, supra, n. 3, 
p. 236. See further, McIntyre, supra, n. 3, pp. 104–116; McCaffrey, supra, n. 3, pp. 407–8; Tanzi and 
Arcari, supra, n. 8, pp. 178–9. 
60) Indeed, it is in relation to internal groundwater resources, i.e. those located wholly within the territory 
of a single State, that one commentator notes
Such sovereign resources, being fully excludable, are private goods. Their “ownership” structure most 
closely resembles private property: a single rights-holder . . . that is subject only to the omni-present 
rule of property ownership sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own so as not to injure 
another).
See Lathrop, supra, n. 37, p. 423.
61) Article 21(3) lists indicative measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of an international 
watercourse on which watercourse States shall consult with a view to reaching agreement, including
a. Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria;
b. Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point and non-point sources;
c.  Establishing lists of substances the introduction of which into the waters of an international 
watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored. 
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groundwater resources.62 This single definition includes both the ‘underground 
geological formation which functions as a container for water’, essentially a static 
territorial element, and ‘the water contained therein’, which will often refer to a 
moving natural resource which might transit from the territory of one State to 
that of another.63 Thus, it combines and confuses a geological element, in respect 
of which it is wholly appropriate to think in terms of sovereignty and even, by 
analogy, property, with a migratory natural resource, in respect of which it would 
be more in keeping with established international practice to think in terms of 
sovereign rights to utilize.64 The important distinction is that sovereign rights to 
utilize are limited by the obligation to consider the sovereign rights of other 
States, identified by means of the process of equitable balancing of needs and 
benefits inherent to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. Though 
the Commentary to the Draft Articles refers to the definition of an “aquifer” 
provided in Article 2(11) of the EU Water Framework Directive,65 this definition 
only includes the ‘geological strata’ and not the water contained therein. It is 
not immediately clear why the Commission could not have provided separate 
definitions for an “aquifer”, focusing on the geological formation, and for 
“groundwater” contained therein, and then set out parallel legal regimes for the 
sovereign control and protection of the functioning of the former and for the 
utilization and shared management of the latter. Though the relevant provisions 
of the 2004 Berlin Rules apply to all aquifers, whether or not recharging or con-
nected to surface waters, Article 3 defines “aquifer” and “groundwater” separately 
and Chapter VIII provides for the precautionary management and sustainable 
use of each, including the taking of measures to prevent ‘the degradation of the 
hydraulic integrity of aquifers’, which relates principally to prevention of the 
related processes of subsidence and compaction.66 Similarly, both the Ixtapa Draft 
62) According to Draft Article 2(a)
“aquifer” means a permeable water-bearing geological formation underlain by a less permeable layer 
and the water contained in the saturated zone of the formation.
63) See Commentary, at Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, 
supra, n. 1, p. 35.
64) As early as 1878, the Swiss Federal Court recognised, in a shared water resources dispute between 
cantons (States), that it was necessary, on the basis of the sovereign equality of States, for the normal 
exercise of sovereignty to be severely curtailed. The Court stated that
it follows from the equality of the cantons that none of them may, to the prejudice of the others, take 
such measures upon its territory, as the diversion of a river or brook, construction of dams, etc., as 
may make the exercise of the rights of sovereignty over the water impossible for the other cantons, 
or which exclude the joint use thereof or amount to a violation of territory.
Argau v. Zurich, Entsch. Des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts (1878), vol. IV, p. 34, quoted by McCaffrey, 
supra, n. 3, p. 390 (emphasis added).
65) Directive 2000/60/EC, (OJ L 327, 22 Dec. 2000).
66) Supra, n. 16.
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Agreement Relating to the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters67 and the 
Bellagio Draft Agreement Concerning the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters,68 
related initiatives by multidisciplinary groups of specialists to draft model inter-
national groundwater treaties, define “aquifers” and “groundwater” separately”. 
Indeed, though the ILA’s Seoul Rules do not attempt to define either “aquifer” or 
“groundwater”, Article III(2) suggests that both elements should be considered 
separately by requiring that basin States consult and exchange relevant available 
information 
(a) for the purpose of preserving the groundwaters of the basin from degradation and protecting 
from impairment the geologic structure of the aquifers, including recharge areas; (b) for the purpose 
of considering joint or parallel quality standards and environmental protection measures applicable 
to international groundwaters and their aquifers.69 
The assertion in Draft Article 3 that ‘[e]ach aquifer State has sovereignty over the 
portion of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system located within its territory’ 
is without doubt the single most controversial departure from established inter-
national water resources law. While it is self-evident that a State enjoys territorial 
sovereignty over any geological formation located within its borders, it was not 
felt necessary to include in the UN Watercourses Convention such a reiteration 
of sovereignty in relation to the portion of the bed of an international river located 
within the territory of each riparian State. More seriously, the move to extend the 
notion of sovereignty to cover the second element of an “aquifer” as defined in the 
Draft Articles, that of the shared waters contained therein, marks a significant 
retreat from the core principles of established international water resources law. 
Indeed, such a move would appear to be inconsistent with the entire historical 
and conceptual development of the principle of equitable and reasonable utiliza-
tion, which at the most basic level can be understood as a means of limiting, on 
the basis of the sovereign equality of States, the application of absolute theories of 
territorial sovereignty to shared water resources.70 A more sophisticated under-
standing of this cardinal principle of international water law appreciates that 
equitable and reasonable utilization requires establishment of a “community of 
interests” approach, normally achieved by means of cooperative institutional 
machinery of the type envisaged under Draft Article 7(2). The community of 
interests approach to the management of shared waters has been endorsed by the 
67) See Ann Berkeley Rodgers and Albert Utton, ‘The Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating to the Use of 
Transboundary Groundwaters’, 25 Natural Resources Journal (1985) p. 715, Article 1. 
68) See Robert D. Hayton and Albert E. Utton, ‘Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft 
Treaty’ 29 Natural Resources Journal (1989) p. 663, Article 1.
69) Supra, n. 23.
70) McIntyre, supra, n. 3, pp. 76–78.
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ICJ in both the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros71 and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay72 
cases, and can only be understood as a diminution of individual State sovereignty 
over shared water resources.73 In a detailed analysis of the community of interests 
concept, McCaffrey concludes that: 
it expresses more accurately the normative consequences of the physical fact that a watercourse sys-
tem is, after all, a unity. It is one thing that is shared by more than one state. All states sharing the 
watercourse system have an interest in it. Because these interests are all in the same thing – even if 
they are not identical – they can be described as forming a community.74
In terms of its practical significance, he further explains that ‘[w]hereas the doc-
trine of limited territorial sovereignty merely connotes unilateral restraint, the 
concept of a community of interest evokes shared governance, joint action’.75 Such 
an approach is totally at odds with the unfounded view expressed by certain 
States, and seemingly supported by the ILC, that ‘water resources belong to the 
States in which they are located and are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of 
those States’.76 
At any rate, the ILC’s Commentary to Draft Article 3 does not make a persua-
sive case for inclusion of an explicit reference to the sovereignty of aquifer States. 
Most of the instruments cited in support of the principle of sovereignty are not 
specifically concerned with the law of shared water resources and, in the case of 
the couple that are, the Commentary is positively misleading in that the two 
references to sovereignty cited in water resources agreements merely reproduce 
the qualified formulation of the sovereign right to exploit natural resources set 
out under Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration.77 Indeed, it is telling that in one of 
71) Supra, n. 6, para. 85, where the Court quoted from a seminal statement on the community of interests 
principle by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International 
Commission of the River Oder case, Judgment No. 16 (10 Sept. 1929), PCIJ Series A, No. 23, pp. 5–46, 
and concluded that 
Modern development of international law has strengthened this principle for non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses as well, as evidenced by the adoption of the Convention of 21 May 
1997 on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses by the United Nations 
General Assembly.
72) Ibid., para. 281, where the Court pointed out in the concluding paragraph of its judgment that 
the Parties have a long-standing and effective tradition of co-operation and co-ordination’ by means 
of which they ‘have established a real community of interests and rights in the management of the 
River Uruguay and in the protection of its environment. 
73) See McIntyre, supra, n. 3, pp. 28–40. See also, Tim Stephens, ‘Sustainability Discourses in Interna-
tional Courts: What Place for Global Justice?’, in D. French (ed.), Global Justice and Sustainable Develop-
ment (2010) pp. 53–56.
74) Supra, n. 3, p. 165.
75) Ibid., (original emphasis).
76) See Commentary, at Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, 
supra, n. 1, p. 39.
77) Commentary, ibid. See Stephen McCaffrey, ‘The International Law Commission Adopts Draft 
Articles on Transboundary Aquifers’, 103 American Journal of International Law (2009) p. 286.
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the instruments cited, the 2003 Convention on the Sustainable Development of 
Lake Tanganyika, the reference to the sovereign right of States is included in the 
Preamble rather than among the general principles listed in Article 5, while the 
Preamble also recognizes ‘that Lake Tanganyika is a shared heritage of the riparian 
States’ and that ‘the riparian States share a common interest in the conservation 
and equitable utilization of the resources of Lake Tanganyika’.78 Similarly, 
Article 5 of the UNECE Protocol on Water Health, which sets out the instru-
ment’s ‘principles and approaches’, including the sovereign right to exploit, also 
places considerable emphasis on the social, economic and environmental values 
of water, equitable access to water for all, and integrated management of water 
resources.79 Thus, in each case, the language used is more supportive of the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation and of a community of interests 
approach to shared water resources. Further, the Commission’s assertion that the 
explicit reference to sovereignty ‘was reaffirmed by many States’80 does not stand 
up to serious scrutiny and, arguably, the support from a very limited number of 
States that this provision did receive reflects ‘advocacy of a position they consid-
ered supportive of their interests’ rather than State practice.81 
If an illustration were needed of the potentially regressive influence that the 
ILC’s reassertion of State sovereignty over shared water resources might exert 
upon subsequent State practice, it has been duly provided by the 2010 Guarani 
Aquifer Agreement.82 The Agreement defines the Guarani Aquifer System as 
‘a transboundary water resource’,83 thereby focusing on the water resource element 
rather than the geological formation, but reiterates that ‘[e]ach Party exercises 
sovereign territorial control over their respective portions’84 after identifying the 
four aquifer States as ‘the sole owners of this resource’.85 The ILC Draft Articles are 
expressly cited in the Preamble to the Guarani Aquifer Agreement and clearly 
played a key role in informing its normative content.86 Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that the Parties were also motivated to include a reference to sovereignty due 
78) Available at http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE001482.pdf. 
79) Available at http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2000/wat/mp.wat.2000.1.e.pdf.
80) Commentary, at Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, 
supra, n. 1, p. 38.
81) McCaffrey, supra, n. 75, pp. 289–291.
82) Guarani Aquifer Agreement (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay), (San Juan, 2 August 2010).
83) Article 1.
84) Article 2 (emphasis added). Article 3 further states that
The Parties exercise in their respective territories the sovereign right to promote the management, 
monitoring, and sustainable utilization of the Guarani Aquifer System water resources, and shall use 
such resources on the basis of reasonable and sustainable uses criteria, respecting the obligation of 
not causing significant harm to the other Parties or the environment.
85) Article 1 (emphasis added).
86) For example, the Preamble to the Guarani Aquifer Agreement cites UN General Assembly Resolution 
1803 (XVII), which features so prominently in the Preamble and Commentary to the Draft Articles. See 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, supra, n. 1, p. 39.
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to concerns of the aquifer States that the recent emergence of the human right to 
water in international law discourse might confer rights to these waters upon 
other, non-aquifer States.87 This reflects confusion as to the possible legal implica-
tions of the human right to water and it is hardly ideal to address one misunder-
standing with yet more legal confusion as to the implications of a reassertion of 
sovereignty over shared waters. Such concerns might be more effectively addressed 
by making it clear that the shared water resources in question are subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the aquifer (or riparian) States.88 
Further, the ILC’s inappropriate assertion of sovereignty is tantamount to cre-
ating “property” in shared freshwater, which is fundamentally at odds with the 
development of international water resources law, as evidenced by the Commis-
sion’s earlier rejection of the doctrine of “prior appropriation” or “aquired rights” 
in respect of the waters of a shared watercourse.89 The ILC’s Commentary to the 
2008 Draft Articles explains that, during their elaboration, the need for an explicit 
reference to sovereignty was promoted by those aquifer States which took the 
view that ‘groundwaters must be regarded as belonging to the States where they 
are located, along the lines of oil and natural gas’,90 suggesting that the unhelpful 
inclusion of Draft Article 3 might be partly due to the fact that the issue of aqui-
fers and groundwater was originally, and entirely inappropriately, programmed 
for examination by the ILC within the topic of “shared natural resources”, which 
was to include confined transboundary groundwaters, oil and gas. The view that 
a comparable approach is taken under international law to water and hydrocar-
bon resources is generally erroneous and fails to take account, for example, of the 
markedly different approach traditionally taken by international courts and tri-
bunals to equitable sharing of water resources and equitable delimitation of the 
continental shelf and the coastal maritime territory of States.91 The uniquely 
87) Comments made during an open discussion at the seminar on Transboundary Aquifers and Interna-
tional Law: The Experience of the Guarani Aquifer System, University of Surrey, 31 August 2010.
88) See Lathrop, supra, n. 37, p. 423.
89) As regards existing and potential uses as criteria to be taken into account in the determination of a 
regime for the equitable and reasonable utilisation of shared waters, the Commentary to the ILC’s 1994 
Draft Articles states clearly that ‘neither is given priority’ and that ‘one or both factors may be relevant in 
a given case’. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
supra, n. 3, at 233. See further, Jerome Lipper, ‘Equitable Utilization’, in A. H. Garretson, R. D. Hayton 
and C. J. Olmstead (eds.), The Law of International Drainage Basins (1967) pp. 51–57; McIntyre, supra, 
n. 3, pp. 164–173. 
90) Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, supra, n. 1, p. 39.
91) See McIntyre, supra, n. 3, pp. 121–153, who concludes at p. 152 that, in contrast to the law on 
maritime delimitation,
it is abundantly clear that in international water resource disputes, the factors to be considered most 
relevant will relate to the water needs of the States concerned, and vital human needs in particular, 
with factors related to the physical and geographical characteristics of the drainage basin relegated 
to secondary considerations.
See further, Fuentes, supra, n. 47, p. 412. 
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distributive approach traditionally taken to the former reflects a recognition of 
the immediate and total human dependence on water. Renewed emphasis on 
sovereignty and on viewing water resources through the prism of “property” 
might have negatively regressive implications for the practice of international 
water resources law generally,92 and may give rise to particular problems in respect 
of emerging water resources issues, such as cooperative management of glaciers 
and glacial meltwater.93 
Though the second sentence of Draft Article 3 purports to limit the exercise of 
State sovereignty over transboundary aquifers ‘in accordance with international 
law and the present draft articles’, by listing sovereignty first among the ‘general 
principles’ guiding application of the instrument, by relegating the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization to the following article, and by including 
such a vague reference in its Commentary to the ‘other rules of general interna-
tional law which remain applicable’,94 the Commission strongly suggests, and at 
least one corresponding State agrees,95 that sovereignty is the primary guiding 
principle which is to inform the interpretation and application of all others. As a 
leading commentator on international water law observes, ‘the first sentence of 
Article 3 lets the genie of sovereignty out of the bottle, and the second sentence 
cannot put it back in’.96 
5. Conclusion
It is important to note that shared international waters have traditionally been 
regarded as a quite unique resource in international law, and have tended to be 
treated in a manner that recognizes the immediate and total dependency of peo-
ples upon water, thus placing greater emphasis on equitable distribution of ben-
efits on the basis of needs rather than geographical or hydrological circumstances. 
However, the Draft Articles appear to presage a drift away from the community 
of interests approach which facilitates such distributive equity and towards an 
92) It is important to note that the Commentary is expansive in its language, citing in support of its posi-
tion on sovereignty
States that are of the opinion that water resources belong to the States in which they are located and 
are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of those States.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, supra, n. 1, p. 39 
(emphasis added).
93) See Erica J. Thorson, ‘Sharing Himalayan Glacial Meltwater: The Role of Territorial Sovereignty’, 19 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law (2009) pp. 487–514. 
94) Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, supra, n. 1, p. 40.
95) Shared Natural Resources, Comments and Observations by Governments on the Draft Articles on 
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, UN Doc. A/CN.4/595 (26 March 2008), comment of Austria, 
pp. 21–22, cite by McCaffrey, supra, n. 75, p. 291. 
96) McCaffrey, ibid.
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approach based on sovereignty and the narrow and short-term self-interest of 
States. If this paradigm-shift in thinking about water resources stems inevitably 
from real and fundamental differences in the hydrological and geophysical nature 
of groundwater resources, then this point should be made clearly so as not to 
undermine decades of progressive development of international law relating to 
shared (surface) water resources. The fact that groundwater has traditionally been 
neglected under international law does not in itself warrant such deviation and 
regression. In order to ensure the overall coherence of international water resources 
law, and to reconcile any future Convention on the Law of Transboundary Aqui-
fers with the UN Watercourses Convention, it may be necessary to elaborate 
separate yet parallel regimes for the geological formation and shared water 
resources making up a transboundary aquifer.
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